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ABSTRACT 
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS MODELS FOR DUMMY ENDOGENOUS 
VARIABLES : A GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION 
WITH AN APPLICATION TO LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION• 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
Paul A .  Bjorn and Quang H .  Vuong 
California Institute of Technology 
A game theoretic approach for formulating simultaneous Over the last decades ,  economists have been increasingly 
equations models for dummy endogenous variables is proposed and 
applied to a study of husband/wife labor force participation. A 
distinctive feature of our approach is that the simultaneous model is 
derived from optimizing behavior as an outcome of a game between two 
players . The equil ibrium concept used is that of Nash . In addition , 
we show that the logical consistency conditions implied by usual 
simultaneous equation models with structural shift actually rules out 
simul taneity for the problem we consider ; in our model , no logical 
consistency conditions are implied on the parameters . 
interested in studying economic decisions involving choice among a 
finite number of alternative s .  For instance , frequently analyzed 
behavioral phenomena are decisions on labor force participation ,  
travel mode , and brands of commodity purchases .  A reason for such a 
trend may lie in the increasing availability and quality of large 
microdata sets . Since the behavioral phenomena of interest were 
qual itative in nature, new statistical models such as the by-now 
well-known logit model were introduced in econometrics (McFadden 
( 1 97 4) , Nerlove and Press ( 1 973 , 1 97 6) ) .
Fol lowing tbe development of the standard linear simul taneous 
equations model ( Koc·pmans and Hood ( 1 953 ) ) ,  the literature on discrete 
variables models ha� rapidly evolved in simultaneous model ing . In 
particular , the fir&t simultaneous models that were proposed were 
directly issued fro� the standard linear simultaneous equations model . 
Specifical ly, the models were formulated in terms of a linear 
simultaneous equations model in latent continuous variables from which 
the observed qualitative variables were generated using a 
• • 
dichotomization such as Y1t = 1 if Yl t > 0 ,  and Y1t = O if Y1t � 0 
( see e . g . , Maddala and Lee ( 197 6 ) , Nelson and Olson ( 1 97 8) ) .  
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More recentl y ,  starting with Amemiya ( 1 974) and Heckman 
( 197 8) , a new generation of simultaneous models for 
qualitative/ truncated variables was introduced where the underlying 
simul taneous equations models were formulated in terms of both latent 
continuous variables and observed qualitative/ truncated variables, 
These models are often called simultaneous models with structural 
shift, As is well-known,  however , a major difficulty that arises with 
these latter models is that they require the parameters to satisfy 
some logical consistency conditions in order that the models be 
statistically meaningful ( se e ,  e . g . ,  Heckman ( 197 8) , Gourieroux . 
Laffont , and Monfort ( 1 9 80 ) , and Schmidt ( 1 981 ) ) , 
With some rare exceptions (Waldman ( 1 981 ) ) ,  the logical 
consistency conditions implied by the simultaneous models with 
structural shift do not have an economic interpretation .  This fact 
explains the few applications of these models in economics . Moreover , 
as Schmidt ( 1981 ) has pointed out , when the exogenous variables are 
qua litative , the associated logical consistency conditions imply some 
recursivity in the simultaneous equation models ,  a feature that casts 
some doubts on the true simul taneous nature of these models . Though 
Maddala (1983 , Sections S . 7  and S . 8i has warned against the 
mechanistic formulation of simul taneous models with latent continuous 
variables . and has argued that in many cases an alternative model 
without logical consistency conditions can be specified , the previous 
models are nevertheless the only ones available in the literature that 
have both latent continuous variables and observed qualitative 
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variables in the equations . 
The purpose of this paper is to present an alternative 
approach for formulating simultaneous equations models for qualitative 
endogenous variables . We bel ieve our approach is a first step in 
integrating game theory into discrete choice econometric modeling . 
For the simple model that we shal l propose , both latent continuous 
variables and observed dichotomous variables wil l appear in the 
equations . Contrary to earlier simultaneous models ,  however , our 
approach will not impose logical consistency constraints on the 
parameter s .  
Second , a distinctive feature o f  our approach i s  that the 
simultaneous model wil l  be derived from optimizing behavior . To be 
more explici t ,  our model wil l  be obtained as an outcome of a game 
between two individuals/players, and the statistical model will be 
generated by invoking the random utility framework introduced by 
McFadden ( 1 97 4 ,  1 981) .  
Third , as an empirical application of our approach , we will 
present a study of the joint decision of a husband and wife whether or 
not to participate in the labor force . We feel that our analysis 
constitutes a contribution to this problem because we explicitly model 
the behavior of a married couple in a game theoretic framework . 
Previous work on this subject has either taken the husband's decision 
whether or not to work as exogenous (see , e . g . , Heckman ( 1 97 4) , 
Heckman and Macurdy ( 1 980 ) ) ,  or specified the labor supply of a 
husband and wife from the outcome of a joint utility function , 
implic i tly ignoring , the problem of aggregation of preferences ( see , 
e . g . , Ashenfelter and Heckman ( 197 4), Cotterman ( 1 981 ) ,  and Gronau 
( 1 97 3 )). 
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The paper is organized as fol lows . In Section 2, we shall 
show that the logical consistency conditions implied by simultaneous 
equation models with structural shift actually rules out simultaneity 
for the simple problem that we conside r .  Since simultaneity i s  an 
inherent feature of the problem, it fol lows that these models are 
inappropriate . Then in Section 3 ,  our game-theoretic approach wil l  
suggest a natural rule for generating the observed dichotomous 
variables , other than the dichotomization rule used in the l iterature 
up to now . The resulting statistical model is derived , and it is seen 
that no logical consistency conditions are implied on the parameters . 
In Section 4 ,  identification and estimation problems are discussed . 
In Section 5, the empirical example is presented . Section 6 discusses 
important general izations , and Section 7 concludes the paper . Proofs 
of all propositions are found in Appendix A and the construction of 
data are presented in Appendix B .  
2 .  SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS MODELS WITH STRUCTURAL SHIFT : A CRITIQUE 
To simplify the discussion, we shall restrict our attention to 
the case where there are only two qualitative endogenous variables . 
To simplify further , we shall assume that these variables are 
dichotomous . As an illustration , it will be convenient to consider 
the decision to participate in the labor force by a husband and his 
wife : 
yh 
Yw 
1 if the husband works , 
0 otherwise , 
1 if the wife works , 
0 otherwise . 
( The subscript indexing the observations is omitted in this section 
and the following one . )  
Most empirical studies on husband-wife labor force 
participation have postulated the maximization of a joint objective 
function . Following the classical tradition in economics , we shall 
nevertheless postulate that each individual maximizes his/ her own 
util ity function . 
The husband and wife decisions need not , however , be 
independent since the utility derived by each individual naturally 
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depends on the action taken by the other . Let Uh( i , j) be the utility 
that the husband derives from taking action i if his wife takes action 
j where i = 1 if the husband works and 0 otherwise , and j= l if the 
wife works and 0 otherwise . The utility Uw( j , i) derived by the wife 
from taking action j if her husband takes action i is defined 
similarly . 
To generate the observed dichotomous variables Yh and Yw' the 
rule that has been used in the literature on simul taneous equations 
models for dummy endogenous variables is summarized in the fol lowing 
assumption . 
ASSUMPTION Al : 
yh = 1 
* 
if yh ) o. 
= 0 otherwise , 
* 
y w = 1 if Yw > o. 
= 0 otherwise 
where : 
* 
Yh = Yw[Uh( l , l ) - Uh( 0 , 1 ) ]  + ( 1 - Yw) [Uh( l , 0 )  - Uh( 0 , 0 ) ] ,
* 
yw = Yh[Uw( l . 1 ) Uw( 0 , 1 ) ]  + ( 1 - Yh) [Uw( l , 0 )  Uw ( O , O ) ] .
The rationale for this model is the fol lowing . If the wife 
works ( Yw = 1 ) ,  then the husband works ( Yh = 1 ) if and only if 
- - 1 
Uh( l , 1 ) 2 Uh( 0 , 1 ) .  On the other hand , if the wife does not work 
- -
( Yw = 0 ) , the husband works if and only if Uh( l , 0 ) } Uh( 0 , 0 ) . 
Combining these two conditions , it fol lows that Yh = 1 if and only if 
* * 
Yh > 0 where Yh is defined as above . The decision rule for Yw is 
similarly derived . 
Following McFadden ( 1 97 4 ,  1 981 ) ,  the utilities Uh( i , j) and 
Uw ( j , i) are treated as random , and decomposed into de terministic 
components and random components : 
Uh( i , j ) Uh( i . j )  + �h ( i , j ) '
Uw( j , i ) Uw ( j , i ) + �w ( j , i) . 
6 
To complete the specification of the statistical model , assumptions 
must be made on the unobserved random components �h( i , j )  and �w( j , i) . 
* * 
From the expressions for Yh and Yw ' it is clear that only the 
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differences �h ( l , 1 ) - �h( 0 , 1 ) ,  �h( l , 0 )  - �h( 0 , 0 ) , �w( l , l ) - �w( 0 , 1 ) ,
and �w( l , 0 )  - �w ( 0 , 0 )  are relevant . We make the fol lowing simplifying 
assumption : 
ASSUMPTION A2 : 
�h( l . 1 ) 
�w( l . 1 ) 
�h( 0 , 1 ) = �h( l , 0 )  - �h( 0 , 0 )
�w( O , l ) = �w ( l , 0 )  - �w( 0 , 0 )
"h. 
"w• 
where ( eh , ew) are normally distributed with zero means , unit 
variances . and correlation p .  
To simplify further , w e  shal l assume that the difference in 
utility that the husband derives from working versus not working , when 
the wife works , differs only by a constant f3h from the utility he 
derives from working versus not working when the wife does not work . 
A similar simplifyir.g assumption is made for the wife . In other 
words , we rule out �econd-order effects . Formally. we have : 
ASSUMPTION A3 : 
Uh( l , 1 ) - Uh( 0 , 1 ) = j3h + Uh( l , 0 )  - Uh( 0 , 0 )  = j3h + Ah, 
Uw ( l . 1 ) Uw ( 0 , 1 ) = f3w + Uw( l , 0 )  Uw( 0 , 0 )  = f3w + Aw . 
Using Assumptions A2 and A3 in the expressions for Y: and Y: . 
it follows that : 
• 
Yh = Ah + phyw + 8h ' ( 1) 
• 
yw = Aw + PwYh + 8w" ( 2 )  
Given the previous assumptions, our model is a simultaneous 
equations model with structural shift ( Heckman (1 97 8) , Schmidt 
(1 981)) . From Schmidt's condition 1 2 . 6 ,  it follows that, for the 
model to be statistically meaningful, the fol lowing logical 
consistency condition must hol d :  
Ph • Pw o. ( 3 )  
i . e . ,  either Ph or Pw must be zero . 
In the simple problem considered here, the logical consistency 
condition can readily be interpreted . For instance, "Ph = 0" means 
that, apart from the statistical association between ah and aw• and 
hence between ah and Yw ' the husband ' s  decision on labor force 
participation does not depend on the actual wife ' s  decision. 2 Thus 
the logical consistency condition (3 ) implies that the decision of 
either one cf the individuals must be structurally independent from 
the decision of the other . In other words, the logical consistency 
condition associated with the above simultaneous equation model with 
structural shift introduces structural recursivity in the model . 
Since simultaneity is inherent in our problem, and since there is no 
reason to impose a priori that Ph or Pw be zero, it follows that the 
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usual approach for formulating simultaneous equation models with 
structural shift is inappropriate • 
3 .  AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION 
As argued by Heckman (197 8) , an important justification for 
the use of simul taneous equations models with structural shift is that 
these models can distinguish structural association from purely 
statistical association among discrete endogenous variables, while 
al ternative models such as those developed by Goodman (197 0) , Haberman 
(197 4) , and, Nerlove and Press (1976) cannot . 3 The previous section
has shown, however, that the corresponding simultaneous model with 
structural shift is inappropriate in our case because of the implied 
logical consistency condition. 
Though Assumption Al defines the crucial dichotomization that 
generates the observed discrete variables Y1 and Y2, that assumption
has not been questioned in the literature on discrete variables 
modeling . We shall argue that Assumption Al is in fact the cause of 
the problems that are associated with the logical consistency 
conditions . Our approach relies instead on the following assumptio n :  
ASSUMPTION Al ' :  The observed dichotomous variables ( Yh, Yw> are Nash
Equilibrium (NE ) outcomes of a game played between the two 
individuals. 
Since the utility derived by each individual depends on the 
action of the other , the natural framework is that of a game between 
the two individual s .  I n  si tuations other than the one considered 
her e ,  the utility fUnctions can obviously be replaced by the 
appropriate payoff functions. Assumption Al ' considers the non-
cooperative Nash Equil ibrium concep t , though alternative equilibrium 
concepts, which may be more appropriate , can be invoked as discussed 
in Section 6 .  
Assumption Al ' i s  not , however , sufficient t o  define how the 
observed dichotomous variables (Yh , Yw) are generated. This is so 
because in many game s ,  and especially for the particular problem 
considered here , a Nash Equilibrium may not exist or multiple Nash 
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Equilibria may arise. As seen below , this difficulty will be resolved 
by increasing the number of parameters. 
To determine the NE outcomes of the game , we derive the 
reaction functions of each individual . Since the outcome space is 
simply (0 , 1 }  X (0 , 1 } , there are only 4 possi bl e  reaction functions for 
each player . These are referred to as H1 , H2 , H3 , H4 for the husband 
and w1 • w2 , w3 • w4 for the wife , as displayed in Figure 1 and Figure 
2 , respectively . For instance , reaction function H1 for the husband 
says that , whether or not the wife works , the husband will always 
choose not to work. 
Given that Hi and Wj are the husband and wife ' s  reaction
functions , we can readily find the Nash Equilibrium . Table 1 
indica tes the Nash Equilibria (or lack thereof) for each of the 16 
possible pairs of reaction functions 
Wife 
l ..t\----H-H -- (.) 
Hf-z 
0 1 
H4 
Husband 
Figure 1: Husband's Reaction Functions 
Wife 
0 
w 
1/ 
4 
�wl 1 
Figure 2: Wife's Reaction Functions 
Husband 
lOa 
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TABLE 1 :  Nash Equilibria 
Husband/Wife w1 w2 w3 W4 
Hl ( 0 , 0 )  (0 , 0 )  (0 , 1 )  (0 , 1 )  
H2 (0 , 0 )  (0 , 0 ) d (l . l ) None ( 1.1 )  
H3 (1.0) None (1.0 ) d (O , l )  (0 , 1 )  
H4 (1.0) ( 1.1 )  (1 , 0 )  ( 1.1 )  
where the first number in the ordered pairs refers t o  the husband and 
the second to the wife . 
As mentioned earlier , a difficulty arises because of the non­
existence or the multiplicity of Nash Equilibria for the pairs 
< H2 , W2l. CH2 , w3 > . (H3 , w2 > and CH3 , w3> .  Instead of introducing some
arbitrary rules,  we shall distribute the probability of occurrence of 
each of those pairs over the appropriate outcomes according to some 
weights . The interpretation of the weights wil l be discussed more 
fully in Section 6 .  Let Pr (i , j) be the probability that the random 
variables Yh and Yw take on the values i and j. Usin_g Table 1, it
follows that : 
P r (0 , 0 )  = PrCH1 t W1 ) + Pr (H1 t W2 ) + PrCH2 t W1 ) 
P r (l , O )  
+ a1Pr (H2 t W2 ) + c1Pr (H2 t w3 > + ct1Pr (H3 t W2 ) (4) 
Pr (H3 t W1) + PrCH4 t W1 ) + Pr (H4 t w3) 
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+ b1Pr(H3 t w3l + c2Pr (H2 t W3) + d2Pr (H3 t W2l ( 5) 
Pr (O , l ) Pr (H1 t w3) + PrCH1 t W4 > + Pr(H3 t W4l 
+ b2Pr (H3 t W3) + c3Pr (Ri t W3) + d3P r (� t W2 ) ( 6) 
Pr (O , l ) = PrCH2 t W4l + Pr (H4 t w2 > + PrCH4 t W4> 
where 
+ a2Pr (H2 t W2 ) + c4Pr (H2 t W3) + d4Pr (H3 t W2 ) ( 7 ) 
a1 + a2 = 1 bl + b2 = 1 
c1 + c2 + c3 + c4 = 1 dl + d2 + d3 + d4 = 1 
all these additional parameters being non-negative . 
Each reaction function wil l ,  however , occur if some conditions 
on the random components eh and ew are satisfied . For instance , given 
Assumptions A2 and A3 , reaction function H1 arises if and only if : 
'\ + eh < 0 and '\ + llh + eh < 0 .
I t  is shown in the Appendix that the conditions that must be satisfied 
by eh and ew are those given by the following table. 
Hl : 
�:
�:
H4 : 
TABLE 2 : Conditions for Husband's Reaction Functions 
eh < - Ah - max (O . llh ) 
- Ah - llh S eh < - Ah if llh 2 0; otherwise cannot occur
- '\ i eh < - Ah - llh if llh < O; otherwise cannot occur
eh 2 - Ah - min (O , llh ) 
Conditions for the wife's reaction functions are essentially the same 
with the subscript h being replaced by w. 
We can now derive the probabilities Pr(i,j) in terms of the 
unknown parameters. Let F(a,b,p) be the c.d. f. evaluated at (a,b) of 
a bivariate normal distribution with zero means, unit variances, and 
correlation p. Let I(a,b.c.d,p) be the integral of the corresponding 
bivariate density over the range a l eh l c, b l aw 2 d.
Equations (4)-(7), we have: 
Using 
PROPOSITION 1: The probabilities Pr(i,j) are: 
Pr(0,0) 
Pr(l,0) 
= F(-Ah' - Aw,p) - a2I++ 
= F(-Ah' - �.p) + c1I+-
= F(-Ah ' - Aw,p) + d1I_+
= F(-Ah ' - Aw,p) 
= F(Ah ' - Aw - Pw · - p) 
= F(Ah. - Aw - Pw· - p) + c2I+-
= F(Ah. - � - Pw· - p) + d2I-+
= F(� - A - p - p) - b I • w w · 2 --
if Ph 2 o, Pw 2 o 
if Ph 2 o, Pw < o 
if Ph < o ,  Pw 2 o 
if Ph < o. Pw < o 
if Ph 2 o. Pw 2 o 
if Ph 2 o, Pw < o 
if Ph < o. Pw 2 o 
if Ph < o. Pw < o 
( 8) 
( 9) 
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= F(- Ah - Ph ' Aw• - p) 
= F(- Ah - Ph ' Aw. - p) + c3I+-
if Ph 2 o .  Pw 2 o 
if Ph 2 o, Pw < o 
Pr(O,l) = F(- Ah - ph, Aw' - p) + d3I_+ if Ph < o, Pw 2 o 
= F(- Ah - Ph ' Aw ' - p) - b1I __
= F(Ah + ph,Aw + p
w.p) - all++ 
= F(Ah + Ph.Aw + p
w.p) + C4I+-
if Ph < o. Pw < o 
if Ph 2 o .  Pw 2 o 
if Ph 2 o. Pw < o 
Pr(l,l) if Ph < o .  Pw 2 o 
where 
= F(Ah + ph,Aw + p
w.p) + d4I-+
w = F(� + ph,Aw + p .p) 
if Ph < o. Pw < o 
I++= !(- Ah. - Aw• - Ah - Ph ' - Aw - Pw.p).
I+- = I(- Ah ' - Aw - Pw · - Ah - Ph' - Aw
,p).
I_+= I(- Ah - Ph ' - Aw• - Ah. - Aw - Pw
.p).
I = I(- Ah - Ph ' - � - Pw• - Ah. - �.p).
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(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
One can readily check that the four probabilities Pr(i,j) add 
up to one irrespective of the signs of Ph and Pw· and are continuous 
with respect to all the parameters. It is then worth noting that the 
proposed model does not imply any logical consistency constraints on 
the structural parameters. In addition, Heckman's logical consistency 
condition (3) can be interpreted in our model. 
PROPOSITION 2: Imposing Ph . Pw = O is equivalent to imposing that
the probability that either one of the four pairs of reaction 
functions CH2,w2> .  (H2.w3> .  (H3.w2>.  (�,W3) occurs is a priori zero. 
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In view of Table 1, it follows that the logical consistency 
condition (3) requires that either the husband's or the wife's action 
be independent from the action of the other, as discussed in Section 
2. 
4. IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
Given the previous expressions for the probabilities Pr(i,j) 
of the observed dichotomous variables Yb and Yw ' the log-likelihood 
function can be written as: 
L � log Prt(Yht ' ywt> (13) 
� [Yhtywt log Prt(l,l) + Yht(l - Ywt> log Prt(l,0)
+ (1 - Yht)Ywt log Prt(0,1) + (1 - Yht)(l - Ywt> log Prt(0,0)] 
where the subscript t indexes the observations. The probabilities are 
subscripted by t since � and Aw are in general functions of
explanatory variables. We assume: 
Aht = x�trh and �t = xwtrw. (14) 
where xht may include characteristics of the t-th household in
addition to characteristics of the husband. A similar remark applies 
to xwt' 
The parameters of the model are (yh,ph,yw,pw,p) together with 
the weights a's, b's, e's, and d's introduced in Equations (4)-(7}. 
In our first work we constrain a priori these weights to satisfy: 
a1 = a2 = 1/2. b1 = b2 = 1/2, c1 = c2 = c3 = c4 = 1/4, and 
d1 = d2 = d3 = d4 = 1/4. In this section and the next, we shall 
assume that the weights are constrained. Notice that this is 
equivalent to distributing the probabilities of the four pairs of 
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reaction functions ( H2, w2) , (Hz, w3) , ( �, w2) , and ( �, w3) equally over
the appropriate outcomes. In addition to simplifying the maximization 
of the log-likelihood function, these constraints will simplify 
identification of the parameters (yh,ph,yw,pw,p), the problem to which
we now turn. 
In order to discuss the conditions under which our model is 
identified, we must first introduce some notation. Define the 
following partitioned matrix A as 
A = [x.:n�1nJC.] wh•r• n. �' "• •r• ''"" 
block diagonal matrices of order 3T, the t-th block of Db and Dw given
by 
Dht 
Dht 
eh fh Ot t 
0 h gt 0
lo 0 h
h 
c J
h et 0 0
0 fh 0t 
0 h hh-gt t 
• Dwt
• Dwt
l
e� Ow 
f�l0 gt 0 
0 0 h� 
L L.J 
w et 0
0 0 
0 
fwt
w w0 -gt ht
if Ph > o, Pw > o 
if Ph < o. Pw < o 
h fh w fw 0 0 et et t t if Ph > o. Pw < 0 
Dht = I 0 (g� + �) 0 ' Dwt = 0 ( w + fw) o gt t or Ph < 0 ,  Pw > 0 
with 
0 fh t h
h
t 0 f
w
t
h • • • • et= f(Aht + Ph)CJ?(Awt + Pw - p(�t +Ph)) 
_h • • 1t = f(Aht)CJ?(-Awt + pAht)
h • • • gt = f(Aht)CJ?(-Awt - Pw + pAht)
h • • • ht= - f(Aht + Ph)CJ?(Awt - p(Aht +Ph>>
w • • • • et= f(Awt + pw)CJ?(�t +Ph - p(Awt + Pw>>
w • • ft = f(Awt)�(-Aht + pAwt)
w • • • gt = - t<Awt + Pw>CJ?(Aht - p(Awt + Pw>>
w • • • ht = f<Awt>.P<-Aht - Ph + pAwt>
hwt
where <I> is the univariate normal c.d.f. and T is the corresponding
p.d.f. A quantity with a "*" means that quantity is divided by the 
square root of 1 - p2. Xh and Xw are of dimension 3T by Kh + 1 and 3T
by Kw+ l, the t-th blocks given respectively as 
rl X�tl
O xht 
... ,ll x�tJ
and 
11 X:tj1 xwt l
lo <tJ 
PROPOSITION 3: The parameters (ph,pw,yh,yw) of the model are
identified if and only if A is nonsingular. 
As can be easily seen, Dh and Dw are nonsingular under 
all four cases since Dht and Dwt are 
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either triangular matrices or can be made triangular by suitable 
permutations of rows and columns. By examining matrix i above, it is 
clear that if A is singular. it will occur extremely rarely tor some 
specific values of the parameters as an artifact of certain 
explanatory variables (note the exception in Corollary 2). 
When compared to the restrictions needed tor the 
identification of linear models, our results are quite surprising. . ' 
For example, even it xht and xwt are the same, it will occur only 
rarely that our model is not identified, a sharp contrast to the order 
conditions w hich is necessary for the identification of linear models. 
Moreover, consider the worst possible case for the identification of 
linear models. Let �t • x�t ax; . the t-th row of the nonsingular 
matrix I; further, let rh • Yw and ph • Pw· Then it follows that
h w h w �t • Awt • At' St • ht • St• and ht • gt • ht. Then we have the 
following result. 
COROLLARY 1: If x�t • X,:.t • x� . I full column rank, rh • Yw· and 
Ph • Pw· the model will be identified if and only if the quantity 
ht/<ht - gt) is a linear combination of xt• for all t. 
Consider the following consequences of the Corollary. First, 
a linear simultaneous equations model of demand and supply, for 
example, satisfying the conditions of Corollary 1 will be hopelessly 
unidentified; the demand and supply curves will be identical. Under 
the same conditions, our model will be identified almost always. Even 
more importantly, under the extreme restrictions of Corollary 1, we 
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can meaningfully test for the equality of coefficients between 
equations since the parameters are identified in this situation. 
A further corollary to Proposition 3 provides a necessary 
condition for identification as shown next. Suppose that constant 
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terms are included in both equations of (14). Define �t 
0 , -rh + xht1h
and A t = yo + x
'
ty where yoh is the coefficient for the husbands'w w w w 
constant term and xht is a vector of explanatory variables for husband 
t. re and xwt are defined analogously for the wife. We then have:
COROLLARY 2: If constant terms <rg and y�) are included in both
equations, and if rh = O and yw = 0 ,  the model is not identified.
Therefore if one intends to estimate the model with both 
constant terms <rg and re> included, at least one equation must
include further explanatory variables or the model will certainly be 
not identified.4
As a practical implication of the Corollary for estimation, if 
one includes a constant term in each equation along with one or more 
additional explanatory variables in at least one of the equations, one 
or more of the initial values for the parameters associated with these 
non-constant explanatory variables must be nonzero. Otherwise, the 
information matrix will be singular at the first iteration, and the 
optimization cannot be carried out. We now turn to estimation. 
The estimation routine we employ is a version of the iterative 
procedure suggested by Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974). 
Assuming that the parameters are identified and the a's, b's, e's, and 
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d's satisfy the a priori weights listed above, maximization is 
straightforward although the log-likelihood takes four different 
functional forms according to the signs of Ph and Pw· Since we do not 
have, for the moment, some initial consistent estimates of the 
parameters (yh,ph,yw,pw,p), we provide various initial values for 
(yh,ph,yw,pw> with a grid search over possible values of p and 
iterative until convergence. 
5. AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE
A. THE MODEL 
The following four equations will be used to describe the 
joint behavior of a representative married couple: 
r • r r wh = Zhrh - PhYw + �h 
r ' r r Ww = Zwrw - PwYh + �w 
rf.1 ' m  m
h = Xhyh + �h 
wm = x'rm + �mw w w w
Equations (15) and (16) describe the reservation wages, or 
equivalently, the shadow price of time for the husband and wife, 
respectively. Note that the wife's decision of whether or not to 
work, given by the dichotomous variable Yw• affects the husband's 
reservation wage in (15). Analogously, the husband's decision of 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
( 18) 
whether or not to work, given by Yh' affects the wife's reservation
wage in (16). Equations (17) and (18) describe the market wages for 
the husband and the wife, respectively. 
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Now let the husband's (wife's) reservation wage play the role 
of the payoff he (she) derives from not working, given by equations 
(19) and (20) respectively. Similarly, let the husband's (wife's) 
market wage play the role of the payoff he (she) derives from working, 
given by equations (21) and (22) respectively. We then have 
' r r Uh(O,Yw) = zh1h - phyw + �h 
' r r Uw(O,Yh) = Zwlw - pwyh + �w 
' m mUh(l,Yw) = Xhlh + �h
' m mUw(l,Yh) = Xwlw + �w
(19) 
(20) 
( 21) 
(22) 
Notice that Assumption A2 on the error terms is naturally satisfied. 
Moreover, we have: 
h uh ' m  'r Uh(l,1) - Uh(0,1) = ph + U (1,0) - (0,0) = Xhyh - Zhyh + Ph 
Uw(l,1) - Uw(0,1) = pw + U
w(l,0) - Uw(0,0) = X�y: - Z�y� + Pw
Thus Assumption A3 is also satisfied. In  addition, note that in 
( 23) 
(24) 
specifying the husband's reservation wage and market wage equations, 
given by (19) and (21) respectively, it may be the case that certain 
explanatory variables appear in both equations, implying that the 
associated coefficient in (23) will be measuring the difference 
between market and reservation wages. A similar comment holds for the 
wife. 
B. SPECI FICATION OF THE MODEL 
We must now specify the set of explanatory variables of the 
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market wage equations and the reservation wage equations for the 
husband and wife.5 Market wages for the husband and wife are specified
in (25) and (26) respectively. Reservation wages for the husband and 
wife are specified in (27) and (28) respectively. 
- . W!1 O 1 2 3 4 m Uh(l, ) = h = yh + yhAGEH + yhEDUCH + yhUNEM + yhRACE + �h ( 25) 
(+) (+) (- ) (-) 
U (1,") = wm = yo + y1AGEW + y2EDUCW + y3UNEM + y4RACE + �mw w w w w w w w ( 26) 
(+) (+) (-) (-) 
r "1l -i -2 -3 -4 -5 Uh(O,Yw) = wh = lh + yhAGEH + yhEDUCH + yhUNEM + yhASSET + yhKIDS1
3
(+) (+) ( -) (+) (?) 
+ y�KI DS14 + Y£RACE - phyw + �� (27) 
(?) (-) 
u (0,Yh) = � = Yo + r1AGEW + ;2EDUCW + Y3uNEM + y4ASSET + y5KIDS13w w w w w w w w 
(+) (+) (-) 
-6 -? r + ywKIDS14 + ywRACE - pwyh + �w 
where (?) (-) 
AGEH Age Of husband 
AGEW Age of wife 
(+) 
EDUCH Number of years of formal schooling of husband 
EDUCW Number of years of formal schooling of wife 
UNEM Local unemployment rate 
RACE Dummy variable indicating race of married couple; 1 
(+) 
(28) 
Black or 
Hispanic, O otherwise6 
ASSET Family's annual income other than from wages or salaries 7
KIDS13 Number of children in family unit 14 years or older 
KIDS14 Number of children in family unit 14 years or older 
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The plus and minus signs under the explanatory variables in equations 
(25)-(28) indicate the expected impact of each variable in the 
respective equation. Note that while the wife's decision of whether 
or not to work has no effect on the husband's market wage, it does 
affect the husband's reservation wage. Analogously, the husband's 
decision to work or not affects the wife's reservation wage but not 
her market wage. From (23) and (24) we now have 
Uh(l,1) - Uh(0,1) = ph + Uh(l,0) - Uh(O,O)
+ 
and 
0 (yh 
-0 1 yh) + (yh 
2 '1.)AGEH + (yh rh Y2>EDUCH + (y� h ""3)UNEMrh 
(y� - y�)RACE - y�ASSETS - y�KIDS13 - �IDS14 + Ph
Uw(l,l) - Uw(0,1) = Pw + Uw(l,0) - Uw(0,0) 
+ 
0 -0 1 -i 2 ""2 3 
<rw - yw) + <rw - rw)AGEW + <rw - rw)EDUCH + <rh 
""3) UNEMyh 
4 -4 -5 -6 -7 (yw - yw)RACE - ywASSETS - ywKIDS13 - ywKIDS14 + pw
The data used in this study on married couples is from the 
(29) 
( 30) 
1982 wave of the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's Panel 
Study on Income Dynamics, 1968-1982. The data was restricted to 2020 
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records for married couples living in the U. S., where both the husband 
and the wife were able-bodied, neither older than 64 years of age with 
no nonrelative living in the family unit. A more detailed description 
of the Panel Study on the selection criteria we used is found in 
Appendix B .
C .  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
From Section 4 it will be recalled that our estimation 
technique requires that we provide initial values of (yh,ph,yw,Pw>
with a grid search over possible values of p and iterate until 
convergence. Having no strong priors over p ,  we estimated all values 
from -.9 to +.9 in .1 increments. As can be seen from Table 3, the 
value of p that maximizes the log-likelihood function appears to lie 
in the interval (-.9, -.7). Therefore we tried all values within this 
interval at increments of .01. The maximizing value of p is -.78, 
which also appears in Table 3. 
Although it may appear surprising that the maximizing value of 
p is not positive, it must be remembered that p is not simply a 
measure of the correlation between omitted variables in the husband's 
and wife's equations, but is derived from a more complicated 
relationship given by Assumption A2. A likelihood ratio test of p = O 
vs. p = -.78 can be easily constructed from Table 3. Since -2(log­
likelihood value for p = 0 - log-likelihood value for p = -.78) - xi,
we can reject the hypothesis that p = O at the 95 percent level. 
Table 5 lists the estimated coefficients and the associated 
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TABLE 3 
Correlation Coefficient (p) Log-likelihood Value 
-.9 -1575.01 
-.8 -1574.44 
-.78 -1574.43 
-.7 -1574.64 
-.6 -1574.91 
-.5 -1575.31 
-.4 -1575.71 
-.3 -1576.14 
-.2 -1576 .53 
-.1 -1576.92 
o. -1577 .30 
.1 -1577.69 
.2 -1578.06 
.3 -1578.44 
.4 -1578.78 
.5 -1579.09 
.6 -1579.48 
.7 -1579.77 
.8 -1580 .23 
.9 -1581.13 
'\ Aw
CONSTANT 
AGEH 
EDU CH 
UNEM 
RACEH 
ASSET 
KIDS13 
KIDS14 
CONSTANT 
AGEW 
EDU CW 
ONEH 
RACEW 
ASSET 
ltIDS13 
KIDS14 
TABLE 4 
p "'0 
Coefficient 
llb
llv
0 -0 
(yb - yb)
1 ""1 
(yb - yb)
2 '"2 
(yb - yb)
3 '""3 
(yb - yb)
4 -4 
(yb - yb)
-5 
- Yb
-6 
- Yb
- :;'b
0 -0 
(yw - yw)
1 -1 (yw - yw
) 
2 '"2 
(yv - yw) 
3 '""3 
(yw - Yw> 
(y! - r!> 
-5 
- Yw
-6 
- Yw 
_, 
- Yw
log-likelihood value "' -1577.30 
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Estimate t-Statistic 
-1.21 -1.830 
1.28 2.130 
0.886 1.240 
0.018 2 .280 
0.132 3.950 
-0.039 -2.180 
-0.099 -0.720 
0.383 1.150 
-0.161 -2.440 
0.111 0.942 
-0.667 -1.150 
-.009 -2.500 
0.032 2.610 
-0.008 -o .993 
.398 , • 5.220 
-0.015 -2.670 
-0.262 -9.000 
-0.061 -1.290 
4.b 4-w
CONSTANT 
AGEH 
EDU CH 
UNEM 
RACEH 
ASSET 
KIDS13 
KIDS14 
CONSTANT 
AGEW 
EDU CW 
UNEM 
RACEW 
ASSET 
KIDS13 
KIDS14 
TABLE 5 
p .. -0.78 
Coefficient 
llh 
llv
0 "1l 
(yh - yb) 
1 -i 
(yh - yh) 
2 -2 
(yh - yb) 
( y
3 - T3)h h 
<r4 - 14> h b 
-5 
- Th 
-6 
- Th 
- Y7 b 
<re - �,
(y
l - yi,
w w 
(y2 - T2> w w 
<r! - Y'!> 
4 -4 
<rw - 1w> 
-5 
- TV 
-6 
- rw
- Y7 v 
log-likelihood value � -1574.43 
24c 
Estimate t-Sta tis tic 
-1.010 -1.800 
2.400 7 .780 
0.649 0.974 
0.018 2 .170 
0.142 4.420 
-o .038 -2 .090 
-0.157 -1.100 
0.383 1.240 
-0 .085 -1.500 
0.172 1.440 
-1.760 -5.050 
-0.010 -2. 790 
0.030 2.530 
-0.005 -0.622 
0.412 5.550 
-0.014 -2.640 
-0.250 -8.610 
-0.062 -1.320 
2 5  
t-statistics for the case p = -.78. A comparison of  Table 4 ,  the 
estimated coefficients and t-statistics for the case of p = 0, with 
Table S indicates that the signs of the estimated coefficients are 
quite robust with respect to p. From Table S we see that both Ph and 
Pw are significantly different from zero <Ph only at the 90 percent 
level), providing evidence that the husband's decision whether or not 
to work depends on the wife's decision and vice versa. From (15) we 
see that the negative estimated coefficient of Ph from Table S implies 
that if the wife works, the husband's reservation wage increases as 
expected. A priori, we would also expect the estimate of Pw to be
negative also; we offer no explanation for the disconcerting result 
that Pw is positive. 
Looking again at Table S, we see that most of the coefficients 
explaining the wife's decision whether or not to work are in agreement 
with our expectations and are highly significant. For example, family 
income from other than wages and salaries (ASSET) and the number of 
children under the age of 13 (KIDS13) have the expected effect of 
increasing the wage at which a wife is willing to accept work outside 
the home.8 Consistent also with our expectations is the indeterminant
effect of number of children 14 years or older (KIDS14) on the wife's 
reservation wage. While the mother may hesitate seeking outside 
employment if she has young teenagers, she may feel compelled to 
supplement the family income for current and future college expenses. 
The estimated positive coefficient on the female race dummy (RACE) 
indicates that women of racial minorities, on average, can command a 
higher market wage than they are willing to accept to enter the labor 
market; that is, minority women are on average worth more in the 
marketplace than they think they are worth. While one may interpret 
this result as saying that racial discrimination in the marketplace is 
not as widespread as minority women are led to believe, the 
discrepancy between reservation wage and market wage may be a 
reflection of past discrimination. The coefficients on the wives' age 
(AGEW) and education (EDUCW) are also consistent with our prior 
expectations; although an increase in either age or education should 
increase the wife's market wage, both should also increase the 
reservation wage. 
Turning next to the variables used to explain the husband's 
decision of whether or not to work, we see that while a number of the 
coefficients are insignificant, the variables to which we attached 
strong priors appear to be significant. For example, the coefficients 
attached to both the husband's age (AGEH) and the local unemployment 
rate (UNEM) measure the difference between the husband's market wage 
and his reservation wage; if the husband is behaving logically, both 
of these estimated coefficients should be close to zero, which they 
are. The positive estimated coefficient on the husband's level of 
education (EDUCH) is surprising; one would a priori expect that an 
increase in education would raise equally the husband's market wage 
and reservation wage. One possible explanation for this surprising 
result is that additional education is viewed by many as a consumption 
good rather than an investment good.9 
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6. GENERALIZATIONS
First, an obvious generalization of our model is to allow the 
weights (ah,bi,cj,dk) to depend on some explanatory variables. 
instance: 
log alt 
a • µt + zt6
a
For
where µ� is a normalizing parameter so that a1t + a2t = 1 and zt are
some household characteristics. (The logit functional form is chosen 
so that 0 < a1t < 1 and 0 < a2t < 1.) The simultaneous model hence
obtained contains our previous model which assumes that the weight 
parameters are constant across observations, or equivalently that the 
parameters 6a,6b,6c. and 6d are zero, with the exception of those
parameters that are associated with the constant term. It follows 
that this assumption can be tested. Another interesting test would be 
to see if 6a = 6b = 6c = 5d O (including the constant term).
Indeed, if this hypothesis is not rejected, then the data would 
support the idea that, when there are two or no Nash Equilibria, these 
two Nash Equilibria or all the four possible outcomes are respectively 
equally likely as we assumed. 
Our second generalization, which is related to the first one, 
deals with the interpretation to be given to the weights. In the 
previous developments, we have restricted ourselves to Nash Equilibria 
in pure strategies. A broader class of strategies is in general 
considered in game theory, namely the class of mixed strategies (see, 
e.g. , Owen (1982)). I n this more general approach, randomness enters
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into the statistical model for two reasons which are (i) the random 
nature of the sampling (or equivalently the econometrician ignorance), 
and (ii) the randomization of the strategies. How can the 
simultaneous model proposed above be interpreted when mixed strategies 
are allowed? 
First. it is worth noting that in 12 out of 16 cases, a unique 
Nash Equilibrium exists (see Table 1). Moreover, it can be shown that 
when there is a unique Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies, then there 
are no Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies (see Appendix, Lemma 1). 
It follows that for those 12 cases, restricting ourselves to pure 
strategies is irrelevant. 
On the other hand, when there are two Nash Equilibria, which 
is our case when the husband and wife reaction functions are CH2,w2)
or CH3.w3>. then a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium may exist. 
However, it can be shown that if this is so, then the (expected) 
utilities derived by each individual when playing the NE mixed 
strategies are strictly less than the utilities they would derive by 
playing at least one of the two available NE pure strategies (see 
Appendix, Lemma 2). This provides a justification for distributing. 
as we did, the probability of (H�.W�>. sav. over the outcomes (1.1) � � -
and (0 , 0) only (see Table 1, and Equations (4) and ( 7 ) ) . 
The third possibility is when there are no Nash Equilibria in 
pure strategies. This occurs when the husband and wife's reactions 
functions are CH2.w3) or CH3.w2>. In this case, it can be shown that
there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies (see 
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Appendix. Lemma 3). Let (qhO ' qh1), where qhO + qhl = 1, characterizes 
the randomization between not working and working for the husband; 
(�,�1) is similarly defined. Then, the weights c1, c2• c3• and c4
defined in Section 3 can be interpreted as: 
cl 
C3 
qhOqWO
qhOqwl
c2 
C4 
qh1 qwo
qhlqwl 
A similar interpretation holds for the weights d1, d2• d3, d4
associated with the pair CH3,w2>. It follows that the model proposed
in Section 3 can be thought of as being a model in which the weights 
e's and d's are left unconstrained. Of course, a tighter 
specification of the model can be derived. Indeed, since the Nash 
Equilibrium in mixed strategies is unique, it follows that the q's and 
hence the e's (or d's) are functions of the structural parameters 
(yh. �h. yw,�w.p).
7 .  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented an alternative approach for 
formulating simultaneous equations models for qualitative endogenous 
variables. Contrary to earlier simultaneous models. our model does 
not require any logical consistency conditions on the parameters. In 
addition, a distinctive feature of our approach is that the 
simultaneous model is derived from optimizing behavior within the 
random utility framework. 
Our approach also emphasizes the role of the equilibrium 
30 
concept used in order to define the process generating the observed 
variables Yh and Yw. The previous section has shown that the proposed 
model can readily allow Nash Equilibria in mixed strategies. Other 
equilibrium concepts are, however, available. For instance, one may 
consider that one player is moving first in which case a Stackelberg 
Equilibrium concept may be used (see Vuong (1982)). Alternatively, 
one may assume that the individuals play cooperatively so as to 
maximize a joint utility or payoff function. Though these latter 
models essentially remove simultaneity, it would be interesting to 
devise statistical procedures that discriminate between these various 
models. Though obviously important work remains, we believe that our 
proposed model is a first step towards integrating results in game 
theory and discrete choice modeling. 
Finally, we presented an empirical application of the joint 
decision of a husband and wife whether or not to participate in the 
labor force. We feel that our study constitutes a contribution to 
this problem because we explicitly model the behavior of a married 
couple in a game theoretic framework, whereas previous work on this 
subject has either taken the husband's decision as exogenous or 
specified the labor supply decisions of a husband and wife from the 
outcome of a joint utility function. Although our model is quite 
complicated, as can be seen from the programming requirements 
indicated in Appendix A, we were heartened to get such strong results, 
both in terms of correct signs on coefficients in which we had strong 
priors and highly significant t-statistics. 
APPENDIX A 
a. Conditions for Husband's Reaction Functions
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Using Figure 1, reaction function H1 can be characterized by
- -
the following two conditions: Uh(l,0) - Uh(0,0) < O and
- -
Uh(l,1) - Uh(0,1) < O. Using Assumptions 1 and 2 these conditions are
equivalent to eh < - Ah and eh < - Ah - ph, respectively, which can be 
combined to give eh< - Ah - max(O,ph). 
- -
Reaction function H2 is characterized by Uh(l,0) - Uh(0,0) < 0 
and Uh(l,1) - Uh(O,l) 2 0, which are equivalent to eh < - Ah and 
eh 2 - Ah - Ph' respectively. When combined they give the result in 
the text. 
- -
Reaction function H3 is characterized by Uh(l,1) - Uh(O,l) < 0
- -
and Uh(l,0) - Uh(0,0) 2 0. Using Assumptions 1 and 2 these conditions
are equivalent to sh < - Ah - ph and eh 2 - Ah' respectively. When
combined, we get the result in the text. 
Reaction function H4 is characterized by Uh(l,0) - Uh(0,0) 2 O 
and Uh(l,1) - Uh(0,1) 2 0, which are equivalent to eh 2 - Ah and
eh 2 - Ah - Ph' respectively, which when combined give
eh 2 - Ah - min(O,ph). 
The wife's reaction functions are derived identically. 
b. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: From Table 2 and the conditions for the
wife's reaction functions, it follows that some reaction functions 
cannot occur according to the signs of Ph and Pw· For instance, when
Ph 2 0 and Pw 2 0, the reaction functions H3 and w3 cannot occur. 
From Equations (4)-(7) it follows that, when Ph 2 0 and Pw 2 0, we
have: 
Pr(0,0) = Pr(8i,W1) + Pr(Hi,W2) + Pr(Hi,W1) + a1Pr(Hi,W2l.
Pr(l,0) = Pr(H4,w1), 
Pr(0,1) = Pr(8i,W4>.
Pr(l,1) = Pr(H2. w4> + Pr(H4,W2) + Pr(H4,W4) + a2Pr(Hi,W2).
Similarly, when Ph 2 O and Pw < 0, the reaction functions H3 
and w2 never occur so we have: 
Pr(0,0) = Pr(H1,W1) + Pr(Hi,W1) + c1Pr(Hi,W3),
Pr(l,0) = Pr(H4,W1) + Pr(H4,w3) + c2Pr(H2,W3), 
Pr(0,1) = Pr(H1,W3) + Pr(H1,W4) + c3Pr(H2,W3), 
Pr(l,1) = Pr(H2,w4) + Pr(H4,W2) + Pr(H4,W4) + c4Pr(Hi,W3).
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When Ph < O and Pw 2 0, the reaction functions H2 and w3 never
occur • Thus: 
Pr(0,0) = Pr(H1,w1) + Pr(8i,W2) + d1Pr(H3,W2),
Pr(l,0) = Pr(H3,w1) + Pr(H4,W1) + d2Pr(Hg.W2), 
Pr(0,1) = Pr(H1,W4) + Pr(Hg. W4) + d3Pr(H3.W2l. 
Pr(l,1) = Pr(H4,W2) + Pr(H4,W4l + d4Pr(H3,W2). 
Finally, when Ph < O and Pw < 0, the reaction functions H2 and 
-/', 
w 
-6 -S w w 
-6 
w 
-6 -S 
w w 
Areas Defining Pr(O,O), Pr(l,O), Pr(O,l), Pr(l,l) 32a 
(O,l) 
(0,0) 
-6 -S h h -6h 
(1, 1) 
(1,0) 
Fig. 3a : Grr'.'.- 0 , SJ:_ 0 
-/', 
h -/\ -s h h 
(O, 1) 
(1,1) 
(O, O) 
( l '0) 
Fig. Jc P·1i< o ,s;:_ o 
-811-sh 
-/',h 
(1,1) 
-6 -s����������-----­w w (O, 1) 
-fl. ,  " w I 
I ! (0,0) 
I 
(1,0) 
Fig. Jb : srr'.'.- o , B 
w 
< o 
-6 -G -
w w 
-fl. 
w 
-i\ -"T (0,1) (1, 1) 
(0,0) I I (1,0) 
Fir,. 3cl : S < 0 6 < 0 h ' w 
w2 never occur. Thus: 
Pr(0,0) = Pr(H1,W1l.
Pr(l,0) = Pr(�,W1) + Pr(H4,W1l + Pr(H4,W3) + b1Pr(�.W3l,
Pr(0,1) � Pr(Hi,W3l + Pr(Hi,W4l + Pr(�.W4l + b2Pr(�,W3l,
Pr(l,1) = Pr<H4,W4l.
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It now suffices to use the conditions on ah and 'w for 
obtaining particular reaction functions for the husband and wife. For 
each of the 4 possible pairs of signs for Ph and Pw· figures 3a-3d 
show the areas over which the bivariate normal density for (ah.aw> 
must be integrated to obtain the 4 probabilities Pr(O,O), Pr(l,0), 
Pr(0,1), and Pr(l,1). (The areas are separated by heavy lines, while 
the lighter lines separate the areas corresponding to the realizations 
of the specific pairs of reaction functions.) 
It follows that the probabillities Pr(0,0), Pr(l,0), Pr(O,l) 
and Pr(l,l) are given by Equations (8)-(11). 
Q.E.D. 
c. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: Since (eh.aw) have a joint continuous 
distribution, it follows from the conditions for the husband's and 
wife's reaction functions (Table 2) that, if Ph = O or Pw = 0 then H2, 
H3, w2• or w3 occur 
with zero probability. 
Conversely, if the pair <H2,w2> occurs 
with zero probability 
it follows from Table 2 that either Phi 0 or Pw i 0, i.e., that 
Ph • Pw 2 O. Similarly if the pair <Hz.W3) occurs with zero 
probability it follows that Phi 0 or Pw 2 0, i.e., that Ph • Pw i O. 
Hence Ph • Pw = O.
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Q.E.D. 
d. First Partial Derivatives of the Probabilities Pr(i,j) 
For brevity, let us rewrite the four probabilities Pr(i,j) 
listed in PROPOSITION 1 using the indicator variables Ih and Iw 
defined as: 
Ih 
1 if ph > o 
o if Ph < o 
1 if Pw > o 
and Iw = o if Pw < 0 
Then we have : 
Pr(0,0) = F(- Aii• - �.pl - IhiwalI++ + Ih(l-Iwlc1I+- + (1-IhliwdlI-+ 
Pr(l,O) = F(Ait, - � - Pw• - p) + Ih(l-Iw>c2I+- + (1-Ih)IwdlI-+ - (1-Ih)(l-Iwlb2I __ 
Pr(0,1) = F(- Ah - ph,Aw• - p) + Ih (1-Iwlc3I+- + (1-Ih)Iwd3I_+ - (1-Ih)(l-Iwlb1I __
Pr(l,1) = F(Ait + ph,Aw + Bw,p) - Ih
iwalI++ + Ih(l - Iwlc4I+- + (
1-Ih)Iwd4I_+ 
Let Cl> be the univariate normal c.d.f. and let f be the corresponding 
p.d.f. Using the identities aF<x,_�Y.p) = f(x)Cl>(y• - px•) and 
aF (�·:·P) = f(y)Cl>(x• - py•) , where a quantity with a "*" means that 
quantity is divided by the square root of 1 - p2• the first partial 
derivatives of the probabilities Pr(i,j) are as follows: 
aF(- Ah. - Aw.p) 
= 0 ! aph 
aF(- Ah' - Aw.p) 
ap = o • w 
aF(- Ah' - Aw. pl 
ayh 
aF( - Ah' - �. p) 
ayw 
• • 
= - f(Ah)cf>(-Aw + pAh)xh 
• • 
= - f(Aw)lf>(- Ah + pAW)xw
aF(Ah' - Aw - Pw· - p) 
aph 
= o.
aF(Ah. - Aw - Pw· - p) 
apw 
• • • = - f(Aw + Pw)lf>(Ah - p(Aw + pw)), 
aF(Ah, - � - Pw· - pl 
ayh 
• • • = f(Ah)cf>(- � - Pw + pAh)xh. 
aF(Ah' - Aw - Pw· - p) 
ayw 
• • • = - f(Aw + Pw)cf>(Ah - p(Aw + Pw>>xw 
aF(- Ah - ph, Aw' - p) 
aph 
• • • 
= - f(Ah + ph)lf>(Aw - p(Ah + Ph)) • 
aF(- Ah - ph,Aw' - p) __ __!!__ -'!..�--- = 0. apw 
aF( - Ah - ph,Aw• - p) = - fCAh + Ph>ct><A: - p(A: + P:>>xh' ayh 
and 
) . . . . aF(- Ah - Ph. Aw' - p = f(Aw)lf>(- Ah - Ph + pAW)xw • ayw 
• • • • aF(Ah + ph, Aw + pw,p) 
aph 
= f<� + ph)cf>(Aw + pw - p(Ah + Ph>> • 
+ p ) • • (A*+ p*)) 
aF(Ah + Ph. Aw w·P = fCA + p )cf>(Ah + Ph - P w w ap w w w 
aF(Ah + ph,Aw + Pw. p) = f(Ah + ph)cf>(A: + p: - p(A: + P:>>xh, ayh 
- ' 
• • *> 
aF(Ah + ph. Aw + Pw·P' R )"'(·· + R - p(A + p )xw= f(A + p T ah Ph W W a -w w Yw 
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aI+  • • • • • • • 
aph
= - f(Ah + ph)lf>(-Aw - PW+ p(Ah +Ph)) + f(Ah + ph)cf>(- Aw+ p(Ah + Ph)) I 
aI++ • • • • • • • � = - f(Aw + Pw>ct><- Ah - Ph+ p(Aw + pw)) + f(Aw + Pw>ct>C- Ah + p(Aw + pw))w 
aI++ • • • • • • -a-= [ -f(Ah>ct><- Aw + pAh) - f(Ah + Ph>ct><- Aw - Pw + p(Ah + Ph»yh 
• • • • • • + f(Ah)cf>(- Aw - Pw + pAh) + f(Ah + Ph>ct><- Aw + p(Ah + Ph))
aI++ • • • • • • -ay- = [ - f(Aw)cf>(Ah + pAw) - f(Aw + Pw>ct><- � - Ph+ p(Aw + pw))w 
• • • • • • 
+ f(A )cf>(- A. - Ph+ pA ) + f(A + p )cf>(-Ah + p(A + p ) ) ] x w -n w w w w w w 
with 
aI+- aI_+ aI++ aT.T = aT.T = - aT.T and
aI__ aI++ 
a<.>= a<.>
e. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
Let zt = (Yht'Ywt·X�t·X�t> and e = cph,pw,yh, yw). Define: 
B = 
[ T alog f(Zt,e> • a1og rczt. e>
J
T 
- E [ ae ae • • > Btt=l £=1 
From Section 4, we have, omitting the subscript t, that 
alogf(Z.0) = yhyw aPr(l.1) + 
Yh(l - Yw) aPr(l.0) 
ae PrCLl) ae Pr(LO) ae 
+ 
(l - Yh)Yw aPr(0,1) +
(l - Yh)(l - Yw) aPr(0,0) 
Pr<o.1> ae Pr(o.o> ae 
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xh • 
Bt is therefore given by
-
E I 
a1ogf alogf 
a11h a11h
alogf lligf 
a11w a11h 
a logf 21.Qgf_
ayh a11h 
alogf alogf 
a11h a11w
alogf a1ogf 
a11w a11w 
alogf alogf 
arh a11w 
a1ogf alogf 
a11h 
, 
arh 
alogf alogf 
a11w , arh
alogf alogf 
ayh , arh 
a1ogr alogf 
a11h a , 'Yw 
alogf alogf 
a11w a , 'Yw
a1ogr a1ogf 
arh a ' 'Yw 
alogf alogf a1ogf a1ogf 
ayw a11h arw apw
alogf alogf 
arw
, 
a logf alogf ·1 ar • arh w ayw J 
alogf alogf is given by For example, ajlh ajlh
2 [ yhyw arrc1.1> ] 
Pr(l,1) a11h 
2 
+ 
r::h(l - Yw) aPr(l.0) ] l Pr(l.O) a11h 
2 2 
+ (C l - Yh>Yw arr co.1> ] + (C l - Yh)(l - Yw> arr co.o> ] 
Pr(0,1) aph Pr(O,O) aph 
where we have used the fact that Yh and Yw take on only the values
zero or one. Since Yh and Yw are random variables where Yh = i,
Yw = j with probability Pr(i,j), i,j e {0,1 } ,  we have that
E [a logf il_ggf] =a11h a11h
2 
+ 1 [ilPr(l,0>1 
Pr(l,0) iljlh j 
2 
1 [aPr Cl.1) ] 
Pr(l.1) aph 
+ 1 (aPr CO.l) l 
Pr(0,1) aflh 
2 2 
+ 1 (arrc o.o> l Pr(0,0) iljlh J 
Proceeding analogously, the remaining terms in B are given by : 
E [illogf . alogf] _ [l Ll 1 aPr(i. j) aPr(i. 1) aek aeh - i=OJ=OPr Ci. j) aek aeh • 
Notice that B can be decomposed into B = A'DA where A is of dimension 
4T by K, K = kh + Kw + 2 , that has as its t-th block:
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arr t < 1. 1 > arrt C l.ll arrt C l.ll arrt(l.'.22_
a11h a11w 
. . 
arh arw 
arrt(l.O) arrt ci.o> arrt(l. O) arrt(l.O)
a11h a11w 
. . 
arh arw 
arrtco.1> arrtco.1> arrt<o.1> arrtco.1>
a11h a11w
. . 
arh ayw
arrt(0,0) arrtco.o> arrtco.o> arrtco.o>
a11h a11w
. . 
arh arw 
_, 
and D is a block diagonal matrix of order 4T, the t-th block given by 
Prt(l.1) 0 0 
.-1 
0 
0 Prt(l,O) 
0 0 
0 0 Prt(0,1) 0
0 0 0 Prt(0,0) 
The model will be identified if and only if B is nonsingular (see, 
e.g., Rothenberg (1971) and Bowden (1973)). Since D is of full rank 
and 4T > K, a necessary and sufficient condition is that A have full 
column rank. From part (d) of Appendix A, it is seen that the partial 
derivatives of Prt(i,j) with respect to the vector 9 depend on the
signs of llh and llw; we must therefore check that matrix A is 
nonsingular for all cases. 
Case 1: llh > 0, llw > 0 
Substituting into At the partial derivatives, using the
notation e�. f�. g�. h�.i = h,w, established in the text, matrix At can 
be written as 
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r h h h 
I ' et-al(et+
ht) 
w w w et -al (et +gt) 
h h -h h h ' 
[et-al(et-!t+gt+ht)] xht 
w w w w w [et-al(et-ft+gt+ht)]
� 0 
� hh
i t 
w gt 
0 
h ' gtxht
h ' htXht 
w ' gtxwt
w ' htxwt
I -a2(e� + h�) w w)-a2<et+gt _h h ..h h h  ' [ fw w :w w w  • [ -rt-a2<et-It+gt+ht)]xht - t-a2(et-ft+gt+ht)] xwt
Now perform the following matrix algebra 
(i) subtract Row 4 from Row l, noting that a1 = a2 = t
(ii) add 1/2 of Row 1 to Row 4 
(iii) adding l/2(Row 2 + Row 3) to Row 4. 
(iv) switch Columns 2 and 3 
Omitting Row 4 since it is identically null, we have 
[ "  h � ' w w w • 1et (et + t)xht et (et + ft)xwt At = 0 h ' w w ' gtxht gt gtxwt hh h ' 0 w ' t htxht htxwt
We now decompose the resulting matrix A into a partitioned matrix
A · [•"X" ; o,x.] 
where Dh and Dw are each block diagonal matrices of order 3T , the t-th
block of Dh and Dw being Dht and Dwt respectively, as given in the 
text. Since Dh and Dw are both nonsingular, for purposes of
identification A may be rewritten as
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A • [x• : o�1 •w '•l 
Case 2: Bh < O .  Bw < O 
Substituting into At the partial derivatives found in Appendix 
A, again using the ei. ti· gi, hi, i = h, w, as established in the
text. now perform the following matrix algebra on matrix A 
(i) subtract 1/2 of Row 2 from Row 3 noting that b1 = b2 = 1/2
(ii) add l/2(Row 1 + Row 3 + Row 4) to Row 2 
(iii) multiply Row 2 by two, adding it to Row 4 
(iv) reverse Columns 2 and 3 
Again. omitting Row 4 since it is identically null, we have 
het
At = I 0 
hht 
h ' etXht 
h ' ftxht
h h , (ht - gt)xht
which can be written as A.
Case 3 : Ph > O .  µw < 0 
wet
0 
-gwt 
w • etxwt 
w , ftxwt
w w ' (ht - gt)xw 
Proceeding as in Case 2, perform the following algebra 
(i) subtract Row 4 from Rows l, 2 and 3, noting that 
� - � - .J - � - ! ul � u2 - u3 - u4 - 4 
(ii) add 1/ 4( Row 1 + Row 2 + Row 3) to Row 4 
(iii) reverse Columns 2 and 3 
Deleting Row 4 since it is null, we have 
het
h � • (et + t)xht 
At = 10 h r? . (gt + t)xht 
hht 
h r? . (ht + t)xht
which can be written as A .
Case 4 : Ph < 0, Pw > 0 
wet
wgt
0 
w w • <et + ft)xwt
w w , (gt + ft)xwt
w w • (ht + ft)xwt 
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Identical to Case 3, this can be easily seen by noting in Part 
(d) of Appendix A that ci = di = 1/4. i = l,2,3,4.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1 : 
Case 1 : Ph > 0, Pw > 0 
Since x�t = x�t = xt and yh = Yw · it follows that
Aht = Awt '"' At. Since Ph = Pw & p .  it further follows that
h _ w _ � _ fw _ f h _ hw _ et - et = et > 0, t - t = t > o . gt - t = gt > O. and
Q . E . D .  
h w ht = gt = ht < o . From the proof of Proposition 
3, it follows that At
can be written as 
.
, 
. r:
,
' 
.
(et + ft)xt et (et + ft)xt
gtxt h htxt.. t
lht ' htxt 0 gtxt
Now perform the following sequence of steps to matrix At. Subtract
Column 4 from Column 2 ; subtract Column 3 from Column 1 ;  add Row 3 to 
Row 2 ; multiply Row 3 by -2 ; add Row 2 to Row 3 ; add 1/ 2 of Column 2 
to Column 4; multiply Row 3 by -1/2; add 1/ 2 Column 1 to Column 3; 
divide Row 1 by (et+ ft) ' (et+ ft f. 0); finally. divide Row 3 by
(ht - gt)• (ht - gt f. 0) . Calling this new matrix At. we have
0 0 
At 0 0 
ht/(ht - gt) xt
etf <et + ft> 
ht
0 
Xt 
. 
(ht + gt)xt where 
0 
rank A = rank A = rank M1 + rank M2, M1 and M2 being T by (K+l) and 2T
by (K+l), respectively. The t-th element of M1 is given by 
ht/(ht - gt) · x�; the t-th element of M2 given
by 
[et/(et + 
ht (ht 
ft) . 
l
xt 
+ gt)x; 
We will now show by contradiction that M2 is of full column 
rank. Assume not. Then there exists A0, A1, . • . • � f. (0,0, • • • • 0) such
that for all t 
and 
et AO(e +
v 
f ) + AlXlt + . • · �XKt = Ot t 
AOht + (ht+ gt) [ AlXlt + • ..  + �XKt] = O
But, by assumption . Matrix X is of full column rank so that A0 f. o . 
Using the above two equations. we get 
ht - et(ht + gt>/<et + ft) = O or etgt = htft for all t. 
But etgt > 0 and htft < O. Contradiction. As is quite clear, the
4 2  
4 3  
occurrence of ht/ { ht - gt) as a linear of xt' for all t, is extremely 
small. 
Case 2: Ph < 0 ,  Pw < 0 
Case 2 proceeds similarly to Case 1. Again, using the proof 
of Proposition 3 . At can be written as 
et etxt et etxt 
At = I 0 . . ftxt 0 ftxt 
. . 
ht { ht - gt>xt -ht {gt - ht)xt 
Now perform the following sequence of operations on At. Subtract 
Column 1 from Column 3; subtract Column 2 from Column 4 ;  add 1/2 of 
Column 4 to Column 2 ; add 1/2 of Column 3 to Column l; divide Row 3 by 
-2; divide Row 1 by et; divide Row 2 by ft ; finally, divide Row 3 by 
{ ht - gt) ' { ht - gt F 0) . Again . calling this new matrix At we have 
At 
rank A 
1 xt 0 0 
. 
0 xt 0 o I where 
0 0 ht/ { ht - gt) xt 
rank A = rank M1 + rank M2 , M1 and M2 dimensioned the same as 
Case 1. The t-th element of M1 is given by ht/ { ht - gt)• as in Case 
l ;  the t-th element of M2 is given by 
[l x�] 
. 
o xt 
By inspection. M2 has full column rank. 
Q . E . D .  
PROOF OF  COROLLARY 2: 
Note that when only constant terms are included, Xh and Xw 
reduce respectively to T repetitions of 
t :1 ond � :1 
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Note also that the blocks comprising Dh are now identical , as 
are the blocks comprising Dw now identical. (This is because 
* * ) A . Aht ' Aht ' Awt ' and Awt no longer depen
d on t • s a result. the matrix 
A repeats itself every three rows. Since K = 4 > 3, B is singular. 
Q.E.D. 
LEMMA 1 : For a two-person, two strategy , normal form game, if there 
is a unique Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies, then there are no 
Nash Equilibria in mixed strategies. 
PROOF : (by contradiction) Let the payoff matrix be given by : 
player A 
player B 
1 ' 2 ' 
. -�-- ---r- - ·  - -
1 ) •u . bu 1 •1 2  • •1 2
2 la21�b21 a2 2 ' b22 
l . --··-
Without loss of generality , assume ( 1 , 1 ) is the unique Nash 
Equil ibrium ;  we therefore have a1 1  2 a21 and b11 2 b1 2 •  Assume a 
mixed strategy N . E .  exists where player A plays strategy 1 with 
probability p and strategy 2 with probability ( 1-p ) ,  O < p < 1 . 
4 5  
Similarl y .  player B plays strategy 1 ' with probabil ity q and strategy 
2 ' with probability ( 1-q) , O < q < 1 . In choosing mixed strategies , 
players A and B must sol ve respectively:  
max E nA = pqa11 + p ( l - q) a1 2  + ( 1 - p) qa21 + ( 1 - p ) ( l - q) a22p 
max E nB = pqb11 + p ( l - q ) b1 2  + ( 1 - p ) qb21 + ( 1 - p ) ( l - q) b22
q 
For a mixed strategy N . E .  to exis t ,  it must be the case that : 
aEnA --ap- = 0 => al lq + a1 2< 1  - q) a21 q + a22 < 1  - q) 
and 
aEnB -aq-- = 0 => b11p + b21 ( 1 - p )  = b12p + b22 < 1  - p )
Case 1 : all = a21 => al 2  = a22 by ( 1 ) 
bl l  = bl 2  = > b 21 = b 22 by ( 2) 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
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We have that both ( 1 , 1 ) and ( 2 , 2 ) are N . E .  Contradiction 
Case 2 : all > a21 => al 2  < a22 by ( 1) 
bl l = b1 2  => b21 = b22 by ( 2) 
Both ( 1 , 1 ) and ( 2 , 2 ) are N . E .  Contradiction 
Case 3: al l  = a21 => al 2  = a22 by ( 1) 
bl l  > b 1 2  => b21 < b22 by ( 2) 
Both ( 1 , 1 ) and ( 2 , 2 ) are N . E . Contradiction 
Case 4 :  al l  > a21 => a1 2  < a22 by ( 1) 
b11 > b1 2  => b21 < b22 by ( 2) Contradiction 
Q . E . D .  
LEMMA 2 : For a two-perso n ,  two strategy , normal form game , i f  there 
exists two pure strategy Nash Equilibria. in addition to a mixed 
strategy N . E . , then the mixed strategy is dominated by either 
( 1) one of the two pure strategy Nash Equilibria or 
( 2) a cooperative game solution. 
PROOF : Let the payoff matrix for Players A and B be the same as that 
given in the proof of Lemma 1 . Assume two pure strategy Nash 
Equil ibria ; without loss of general ity , let them be ( l , l ' )  with payoff 
< a11 , b11 > and ( 2 , 2 ' )  with payoff < a22 , b22 > .  For a mixed strategy N . E . 
to exis t ,  we know from Lemma 1 that we must have 
aEnA 
-ap- = al lq - a2l q + a12 < 1 - q) - a22 ( l - q) = O ( 1) 
a22 - al 2 
=> q = all - a21 - al 2 + a22 with 0 < q < 1 ( 2) 
and 
aEnB -aq- = b11P + b21 ( 1 - p) - b1 2P - b22 ( 1 - p )  = 0 
b22 - b? t  =1 P = b _ b b
--
_ b 
with O < p < 1 
11 12 + 22 21 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for ( 2) and ( 4) to hold 
are that 
a22 - a1 2  > o .  b22 - b21 > O 
al l  - a21 > O , bl l  - b12 > O 
Substituting ( 2) into ( 1 ) ,  we ge t the payoff for player A :  
al l  a22 - a1 2a21 nA = al l  + a22 - al 2  - a21 
Similarly , substi tuting ( 4) into ( 2) gives the payoff for player B :  
b11b22 - b12b21 nB = bl l  - b1 2  + b22 - b21 
Therefore the payoff to players A and B when they play a mixed 
strategy is given by ( nA , nB) .  For ease of notation , let
C C 1 , c 2> = ( nA , nB) .  We want to compare C a1 1 . b11 > and < a22 . b22 J with 
( Cl , C2) . 
Now all - c l 
and 
( al l  - a1 2> < a11 - a21 ) 
al l  + a22 - al 2  - a21
( a22 - a21 ) ( a22 - al 2) 
a - C = --- --- -22 2 al l  + a22 - a1 2  - a21 
From ( 5) ,  we have that 
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(3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
sgn ( a1 1  - c 1 ) = sgn ( a11 - a1 2> 
sgn ( a22 - c1 ) = sgn < a22 - a2 1 > 
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If a1 2  > a1 1 , then a11 < c 1 • Also . a22 > a1 2  > a11 > a21 => a22 > c 1 . 
If a22 > a2 1 , then a22 < c1 . Also , a1 1  > a21 > a22 > a1 2  => a11 > c 1 . 
In either 
Also , bl l
b22 - c2 =
case , max {a11 . a22 l > c 1 •
( bll - b21 ) ( b11 - b1 2
> 
- c =2 b l l  + b22 - b12 - b 21
( b22 - b21 ) ( b22 - b12> 
b l l  + b22 - b21 - b12
Again from ( 5) ,  we have that 
sgn ( b 11 - c 2J = sgn Cb11 - b21 > 
sgn ( b22 - c 2 ) = sgn C b22 - b1 2l 
and 
If b11 < b21 • then b11 < c2 . Also , b22 > b21 > b11 > b12 => b22 > c2 •
If b22 < b1 2 , then b22 < c2 • Also , b1 1  > b1 2  > b22 > b21 => b11 > c2 . 
In either case . max Cb11 , b22} > c2 . Now if max {a11 , a22 l = a1 1  and 
max Cb11 , b22 } = b1 1  or max Ca11 . a22 } = a2 2  and max {b11 , b22 1 = b22 , then 
we know that the mixed strategy N . E .  is dominated by a pure strategy . 
On the other hand , if max £a11 , a221 = a1 1  and max Cb11 , b221 b2 2  or 
max £a1 1 . a22 l = a22 and max Cb11 , b22l = b1 1 , we revert to a bargaining 
solution from cooperative game theory , which dominates a mixed 
strategy Nash Equilibrium . In ei ther case , the mixed strategy will be 
dominated by some game theoretic solution . 
Q . E . D .  
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LEMMA 3 :  For a two-person ,  two strategy , normal form game , if there 
are no Nash Equil ibria in pure strategies ,  then there exists a unique 
Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies . Existence is well known ( see 
e . g . ,  Owen ( 1982 ) ,  p .  1 26 ) . From Lemma 1 we know that for a mixed 
strategy N . E . to exist , we must have 
aE11A 
ap 
and 
0 => q 
a22-a1 2  
al l-a1 2-a2 1  + a22
' al l-al 2-a21 + a22 F 0 
aE11B b22-b21 
( 1 ) 
----aq- = o => P = b -b -b + b ' b11-b1 2-b21 + b22 F o ( 2) 11 12 21 22 
We need only show that q F 0 ,  q F 1 , p F 0 ,  and p F 1 . Assume 
q 
q 
p 
a12 => a pure strategy N . E .  exist s . Assume 0 => a22 
1 => al l a21 => a pure strategy N . E .  exist s . Similarl y ,  for 
0 and p = 1 , a pure strategy N . E .  exists . Contradiction. 
Q . E . D .  
APPENDIX B 
MEANS AND VARIANCES OF THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
MEAN VARIANCE 
AGEH Age of Husband 3 6 . 7  109 . 0  
AGEW Age Of Wife 3 4 .3 97 . 4  
EDU CH Husband ' s  education ( years) 1 2 . 6  4 . 3 2 
EDU CW Wife ' s  education ( years ) 1 2 .7 6 . 6 5  
UNEM Local uemployment rate 9 . 4 9  13 . 8 
ASSETS Family non-wage income 
( in thousands $) . 9 86 22 . 6  
KIDS13 Number o f  children 13 or 
younger 1 . 22 1 . 2 8 
KIDS1 4 Number of children 1 4 or 
older . 2 96 .45 8 
RACE Race dummy ( 1 if 
Black or Hispani c ,  0 otherwise . 252 
Below we l ist the selection criteria used . Of the original 
6 7 42 observations , we were left with 2020 observations after 
selection. 
( 1 ) Family composition change in 1 982 was restricted to children 
moving in or out of the home ; husband and wife remained married 
and in the home . Loss : 22 95 observations . 
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( 2) Family was restricted to husband , wife and children. Loss : 13 49 
observations . 
( 3 )  Both the husband and the wife were restricted to be 6 4  years or 
less in age . Loss : 21 9 observations . 
( 4) Husbands who stated they were retired , permanently disabled , 
temporarily laid-off ,  or students were exclude d .  Those who 
stated they were "working now " were classified by us as working ; 
those who answered "looking for work , unemployed , "  were 
considered to be not working . Loss : 3 3 1 observations . 
( 5) Wives who stated they were retired , permanently disabled , 
temporarily laid-off , unemployed but looking for work . or 
students were excluded from the sample . Those who stated they 
were "working now " were classified by us as working ; those who 
answered "housewife" were considered to be not working . Loss : 
17 4  observations . 
( 6 ) If either the husband or the wife had a physical or nervous 
condition that limited the type or the amount of work they could 
do , they were excluded from the sample . Loss : 287 observations . 
( 7 ) If any record contained missing data for the 10 explanatory 
variables used in the analysis . that record was dropped . Loss : 
67 observations . 
Of the 2020 observations remaining after selection, the 
numerical breakdown based upon husband/wife employment status is 
described in the fol lowing table . 
WIFE 
Working 
Not 
working 
HUSBAND 
Working 
1204 
739 
Not 
working 
4 8  
29 
5la 
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FOOTNOTES 
• The early stage of this work was done while the second author was 
visi ting the Universite ' des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse where 
he benefited from insightful discussions with J .  J .  Laffont . D .
Lien and R .  McKelvey provided helpful comments o n  the game 
theoretic part of this paper . Finally , we are greatly indebted
to D. Gre ther and D .  Rivers for valuable criticisms . Remaining 
errors are of course ours . 
1 .  When an individual is indi fferent between working and not 
working , we arbitrarily considers that he will work,  hence the 
use of the weak inequality . 
2 . The condition Ph = O holds if one assumes that the husband ' s
utility function i s  additively separable so that Uh ( Yh , Yw) = 
Uh ( Yh ) + Uw( Yw) .  Then � = Uh( l ) - Uh ( O) .  I am grateful to 
Donald Lien for poi nting this out . Note . however , that assuming 
the husband ' s  util i ty function to be additively separable 
essentially removes simultaneity as is argued in the text . 
3 .  See , however , Vuong ( 1 980 . 1 981 . 1 982 ) .
4 .  An intuitive argument for such a result is tha t ,  when there are 
no explanatory variables other than the two constant terms , then 
the model has four parameters ( including Ph and Pw > while there
are four probabilities to be explained of which only three are 
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independent . 
s .  The se t of explanatory variables used in our empirical analysis 
will present no surprises;  Indeed , most empiriccal studies of 
labor force participation using cross-section data use a fairly 
common se t of explanatory variables ( see , e . g . , Ashenfel ter and 
Heckman ( 1 97 4) , Gronau ( 1 97 3 ) , Heckman ( 197 4 , 1 97 6) , and Nakamura 
and Nakamura ( 1 981 ) ) .  
6 .  The Panel Study of Income Dynamics asked only the race of the 
head of household ; if married , the Panel Study assumed the spouse 
to be of the same race . 
7 .  For a discussion of the appropriateness of including current 
8 .  
assets i n  a labor supply equation, see Cotterman ( 1 981 ) • 
-s -6 Note from ( 3 0) that yw and yw enter with negative signs . 
9 .  See , e . g .  Lazear ( 1 97 7 )  for a discussion of this particular 
hypothesi s .  
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